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The Russian Government
in Our Courts
BOARDMAN WRIGHT*
Will our courts be compelled to modify their rules as to suits against
foreign governments, because of the commercial activities of the
Russian Soviet Government?
The present Russian government has reserved to itself the sole
right to conduct foreign trade. It may conduct such trade by its
own agents and in its own name, or by agencies established by it for
that purpose. If the former plan is adopted, our courts will be faced
with greater difficulties than if the latter one is favored.
It is an established principle of international law that suit will not
lie in our courts to enforce a liability in contract or in tort against a
foreign government without its consent.'
This principle has been applied, in some instances, even to suits
in rent, as in admiralty, when the sovereign either appeared and
claimed immunity, or made proper diplomatic representations.
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According to the weight of authority, this rule is not applicable
when the suit is not directly against the foreign government, but
against an agency (often a corporation) organized or appointed to
conduct business, 3 nor to suits quasi in ren to determine the title to
real or personal property within the jurisdiction of the court.4 Nor
does it apply, at least in this country, to suits against an officer of the
government who is alleged to have exceeded his authority.5
*Of the Bar of the City of New York.
'See Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U. S. (20 How.) 527 (1857); U. S. v. Diekelman,
92 U. S. 520, 524 (1875); Oliver Co. v. Mexico, 264 U. S. 440 (1923); Transportes
Maritimos v. Almeida, 265 U. S. 104 (1923); Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205
U. S. 349 (19o6); Ex parte NewYork, 256 U. S. 490 (1920); Mason v. Intercolonial
Ry. Co., 197Mass. 349 (19o8); Wulfsohn v. Russian Republic 234 N. Y. 372(1923).
2See the cases collected in Re Muir, 254 U. S. 522, 532-533 (1920).
Contra: The Prins Frederik, 2 Dodson 451 (1820); The Charkieh, L. R. 4 Adn.
& Ecc. 59 (1873); Clarke v. Steam Nay. Co. I Story531, (184); Ex Parte Trans-
portes Maritimos, 264 U. S. 105 (1923); The Jupiter, i9 Lloyd Lists 325 (1924).
3Hopkins v. Clemson Agricult. College of So. Car., 221 U. S. 636 (191o);
Molina v. Comision Reguladora del Mercado de Henequen, 91 N. J. L. 382
(ii8); Brisco v. Bank of Commonwealth of Kentucky, ii Pet. (U.S.) 257 (1837);
Pilger v. U. S. Steel Corp. and Public Trustee, 127 Atl. (N. J.) 103 (1925); Sloan
Shipyards Corp. v. U. S. Shipping Board, 258 U. S. 549, 566 (1921); Asram-
Robertson Lamp Works, Ltd. v. Public Trustee, 23 Rep. of Patent Cas. 189;
Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter & Carpenter, 300 Fed. 891 (1924).4Pilger v. U. S. Steel Corp. and Public Trustee, 127 Atl. (N. J.), 103 (1925);
Gladstone v. Musurus Bey, I H. & M. 495 (1862); Smith v. Weguelin, L. R. 8 Eq.
198 (1869); Lariviere v. Morgan, 1871-1872 L. R. 7 Ch. App. 550 (1871).
'Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738; U. S. v. Lee, io6 U. S. 196 (1882). Phila-
delphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 619 (1911) and cases there cited.
49
THE CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
In two of the cases cited above (Wilfsohn v. Russian Republic,
supra, and The Jupiter, supra), the present Russian government has
asserted its immunity. One involved the right to money on deposit
in a New York bank, the other ownership of a vessel in an English
port.
The situation may be rendered more difficult by a recognition by
our government of the present Russian government, either as a de
facto or as a de jure government. At present, because of non-recog-
nition, our courts not only deny its right to sue,6 but refuse to recog-
nize its decrees, as for instance, a decree dissolving an insurance cor-
poration and confiscating its assets, at least so far as regards contracts
of the corporation enforcible in the United States.7 In the cases cited
the New York courts treated the corporation as still existing, and in
one of them even when the suit was by an English beneficiary, al-
though the Soviet government had been recognized by England.
But the United States Supreme Court has laid down the rule that
such recognition "is retroactive in effect, and validates all the actions
and conduct of the government so recognized from the commence-
ment of its existence," and this rule was approved and followed by
the High Court of Justice in England, upon the recognition by that
government of the Russian government. 9
Whether confiscation of property by a recognized foreign govern-
ment would be held applicable to property in this country is doubtful:
the contrary has been held in one case.' 0 In the New York decisions
above cited, this question was left open.
In the past, commerce between nations has been conducted, almost
universally, by private corporations. If a foreign government sends
an official here to buy and sell goods, and conduct business generally,
for it and in its name, reserving the right to object to the jurisdiction
of our courts whenever a suit is brought against its representative,
while retaining the right to sue whenever it so desired, the situation
might easily become intolerable. It would seem that either the
Russian government should act by some agency which would be
suable as a person distinct from the sovereign, or it should waive its
immunity as regards ordinary commercial transactions, or our courts
6Russian etc, Republic v. Cibiario, 235 N. Y. 255 (1923).7James v. Second Russian Co. 239 N. Y. 248 (1925); Sokoloff v. Nat.
City Bk., 239N.Y. I58, (I924) ;JointStock Co. v. Nat. CityBk., 21oA. D. 665 (I924);
Bourne v. Bourne, 204 N. Y. Sup. 866 (1924).
80etjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297, 302-303 (1917). cf. Williams v.
Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176, 186 (1877). Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 253 (1896).9Lutherv. Sagor, (1921) 3 K. B. 532.
XOBaglin v. Cusenier Co., 156 Fed. 1OI5 (19o5); mod. and affd. 164 Fed.
256 (1908); 221 U. S. 580 (1910).
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must adopt the view that the rule is inapplicable to foreign govern-
ments engaging in such transactions, especially in this country, ex-
tending to such cases the principles laid down in Molina v. Comision,
etc.," where the New Jersey Supreme Court, after reviewing the
decisions, held as follows:
"The dignity of the government, if it suffers at all, suffers
because it voluntarily enters into a commercial enterprise and
its independence is not affected by proceedings against the
corporation. The extension of the rule of immunity has been
carried far, since in Marshall's day it was a question whether
even a public vessel of war was immune from seizure; but it
has never been carried so far as to permit a foreign government
to detract from the independence and dignity of the nation
which was hospitable to its corporations by making them public
agencies and thereby attempting to withdraw them from the
jurisdiction of their host. The independence and dignity of a
state requires that it should be free to exercise jurisdiction quite
as much as in a different case it should refuse to exercise juris-
diction. The dignity and independence of New Jersey is quite
as important as the dignity and independence of Yucatan. Our
dignity and independence would suffer if we should be unable to
exercise jurisdiction in our own borders over a business corpora-
tion which is here only by our courtesy. That courtesy is ex-
tended, or must be assumed to be extended, to the corporation
upon terms that it shall be subject to our laws."
n'Supra footnote No. 3; upon the general question whether a foreign govern-
ment may be sued, see Vol. 10 CORNELL LAW QUARTE1RLY 390, noting Pilger v.
U. S. Steel Corp. and Public Trustee, 127 Atl. (N. J.) lO3.
